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By considering a regional sample of Italian inventors, this paper explores the factors behind the 
different individual performances in terms of number and quality of patents. Our reference 
population is composed of 570 inventors residing in the Marche region who, over the period 
1991-2005, have contributed to 743 patent applications filed at the European Patent Office. 
Looking at the number of patents per inventor, a Lotka’s distribution emerges suggesting that 
also for geographical areas inventive activities are highly concentrated in a few key inventors. 
To examine whether both the inventive productivity and quality are affected by individual and 
firm characteristics, we use the outcomes of a survey on 106 inventors. We find that the patent 
productivity is not influenced by individual characteristics but it is higher for the inventors 
working in teams and employed in large firms with greater patent portfolios. With respect to 
patent value we employ a composite index in which forward citations, claims and patent 
families are taken into account. Measured in this way, patent quality is significantly associated, 
along with the presence of an inventive team, with a set of individual features such as the 
inventors’ experience and level of education. This suggests that inventions coming from 
individuals working in small firms or independently can be as valuable as those generated by 
inventors occupied in larger companies. 
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Albeit imperfect indicators of innovative activities, patent data have been extensively 
used in empirical studies concerned with industries, firms, countries and regions with a view to 
explain their economic performances. To overcome a typical drawback of count data, the 
patents (or patent applications) attributed to a unit of observation should be weighted by their 
technological and economic value which can be approximated by some quality measures, such 
as forward citations. Thanks to the recent availability of comprehensive databases containing 
information on a number of patent characteristics, the economists of innovation have 
increasingly taken into account the qualitative dimension of patenting.  
The above advancements, coupled with the recent explosion of patent applications and the 
mounting importance of Intellectual Property Rights, help explain why the economic analysis 
of patenting is thriving. In this favourable context, little attention has been devoted to the role 
played by inventors in spite of the fact that patented or patentable inventions derive from their 
ingenuity and creative work. If the majority of inventors were dependent workers of the 
companies applying for patents or holding patent rights, there will be little or no reason for 
taking them as units of observations. However, this is not the case. As documented in this 
paper, in a time span of 39 years, 58% of the applicants who have obtained a patent from the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) have got only one patent. In Europe, 
from 1991 to 2005, 2 out of 3 applicants at the European Patent Office (EPO) have sought 
patent protection only once. This suggests that a remarkable share of inventors is composed of 
entrepreneurs or owners of small firms, as well as individuals having nothing to do with extant 
business units. Moreover, some case studies have shown that also in large companies - holding 
a very high number of patents - most of their inventive outcomes derive from the work of a few 
key inventors. Accordingly, the distribution of patents among inventors is extremely skewed, 
with the key inventors of large companies contributing to a disproportionate share of patents. 
However, there is little evidence on whether the distribution of inventive outputs is equally 
skewed when the quality of patented inventions is taken into account. 
In this paper we analyse the inventive productivity and patent quality of the inventors residing 
in an Italian region, the Marche, who have contributed to 743 patent applications filed at the 
EPO during the period 1991-2005.  Looking at the number of patents per inventor, a Lotka 
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distribution emerges suggesting that also for geographical areas inventive activities are highly 
concentrated in a few key inventors. To examine whether both the inventive productivity and 
quality are affected by individual and organizational characteristics, we use the outcomes of a 
survey on 106 inventors. We find that patent productivity is not influenced by individual 
characteristics but turns out to be higher for inventors working in teams and those employed in 
large firms with greater patent portfolios. With respect to patent value we employ a composite 
index in which forward citations, claims and patent families are taken into account. Measured 
in this way, patent quality is not significantly associated with the inventors’ productivity but it 
is positively affected by the presence of an inventive team and a set of individual features such 
as the inventors’ experience and level of education. This suggests that the distribution of patent 
quality among inventors can be less skewed than that of patent counts or, to put it another way, 
that inventions coming from individuals working in small firms or independently can be as 
valuable as those generated by inventors occupied in larger companies.   
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the patents’ distribution among 
inventors according to count data. Section 3 illustrates the main features of the inventors 
composing our sample and, on the basis of different measures, the quality of their patent 
applications. In section 4 we estimate a composite index of patent quality extracted from 
forward citations, claims and patent families. Section 5 presents the results of a regression 
analysis for both the number of patent applications per inventor and their average quality. 
Section 6 concludes.  
2. The patents’ distribution among inventors 
 
This paper explores the patenting activities of a small subset of Italian inventors, those 
residing in the Marche region. Located in the east side of Central Italy, Marche hosts 1.48 
million people and, compared to other European regions, has a low propensity to apply for 
EPO patents: in 2002, it recorded 55 EPO applications per million inhabitants while the 
average for the whole EU15 was 160. However, from 1991 to 2004 the number of applications 
submitted by Marche residents increased from 35 to 82, i.e. by 147%, while the EPO 
applications coming from EU residents rose by 90%. Thus, although the absolute and relative 
figures are not remarkable, Marche inventors have ascribed an increasing importance to 
European patents. 
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For the purposes of our study, we have considered the patent applications filed at the EPO 
during the period 1991-2005 (and published by December 2006) in which both the applicant 
and at least one inventor were residing in the Marche region1. In this way, we got a population 
of 570 inventors contributing to 743 patent applications.   
Looking at the distribution of patents among inventors we found that the large majority of them 
(75%) contributed, in a time span of fifteen years, to one patent application only. At a first 
sight, we interpreted this prevalence of ‘occasional’ inventors as a peculiar feature of the 
Marche region (probably due to a low presence of high-tech industries and large firms; cf. 
Schettino and Sterlacchini, 2007). However, by examining how patents are distributed in other 
much broader contexts we discovered that this is not the case. In fact, as Table 1 shows, the 
prevalence of occasional inventors appears to be a generalised phenomenon. 
 
Table 1 – Number and percentage of patent applications (EPO) or patent grants (USPTO) per 
inventor 
 EPO-Marche EPO-EU15* USPTO** 
 No. Perc. No. Perc. No. Perc. 
1 patent 429 75% 427825 69% 908152 58% 
2-4 patents  116 21% 149714 24% 454076 29% 
5-9 patents 17 3% 31571 5% 125262 8% 
10 or more patents 8 1% 12367 2% 78289 5% 
Total inventors 570  621478 
 
 1575780  
*Own computations from OECD/EPO patent citation database. Period: 1991-2005. 
**Trajtenberg (2005) with data taken from the NBER Patent Data File. Period: 1963-1999. 
 
 
By using the OECD/EPO patent citations database2 (which contains information for all the 
patent applications filed at the EPO since 1978; cf. Webb et al., 2005) we found that, over the 
period 1991-2005, 69% of the inventors residing in the EU15 countries took part to one patent 
application only. Thus, the Marche inventors seem less prolific than their European 
counterparts but the gap is not substantial3. Table 1 also presents the patents per inventor 
                                                          
1 The few Marche inventors contributing to extra-regional inventions were neglected because, through a survey, 
we wanted to obtain information on both regional inventors and applicants. 
2 We are grateful to Colin Webb for providing us with the database. 
3 It must be added that the gap becomes negligible by excluding the patent applications in the technological fields 
of Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals and Electrical engineering in which the Marche inventors are by far less 
5 
granted by the USPTO, a figure extracted by Trajtenberg (2005) from the NBER Patent Data 
File (Hall et al., 2001). Along with the different reference period, the comparison with EPO 
applications is limited by the fact that, here, we are dealing with patent grants which are less 
likely to be obtained by occasional applicants. In spite of that, also in the United States the 
majority of inventors contributed to only one patent in a time span of 37 years. Albeit such a 
finding has not been sufficiently emphasised in the literature, as a stylized fact, most of the 
inventors try to get (or get) a patent once in a lifetime.  
Obviously, this does not mean that patenting output is dominated by small entities. On the 
contrary, patent applications and grants are extremely concentrated. Suffice it to say that, at the 
EPO, 80% of applications come from fewer than 20% of applicants and, in 2006, the ten most 
active companies account for 12% of total applications (European Patent Office, 2007). But, 
how patents are distributed among inventors working in large companies? A seminal 
contribution in this direction was provided by Narin and Breitzman (1995) who found, also for 
these inventors, a remarkably skewed distribution ruled by a Lotka’s law.  
Looking at chemistry publications, Lotka (1926) discovered an inverse square law of academic 
productivity: the number of people producing n papers is proportional to 1/n2, i.e. for every 100 
researchers with one paper, there are 100/22, with two papers, 100/32 with three, and so on. 
Shifting the analysis from academic to industrial research, Narin and Breitzman fitted the 
above law into the patents’ distribution of inventors. Such a parallelism is justified by the same 
concept of power law, i.e. a mathematical representation of a natural law, which simply states 
that most of the brightest ideas are the products of a few outstanding brains4. This may be due 
to different motives such as ‘experience’ and ‘prestige’, although the main reason rests on the 
normal distribution of ‘intelligence’ (Ernst et al., 2000). However, with the partial exception of 
experience, many of these explanatory factors can be hardly quantified. Moreover, while for 
academics the role of individual prestige can be very important, the same cannot be assumed 
for inventors because, to be patented, an invention must fulfil a set of ‘objective’ requirements 
established by the patent law. This is not to say that, especially nowadays, to publish an article 
in a highly ranked journal is easier than to have a patent granted by the USPTO or the EPO. 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
specialized (cf. Schettino and Sterlacchini, 2007). 
4 With a view to find an (albeit partial) explanation, de Solla Price (1976) developed a probabilistic model of 
academic publications – the so-called square root of elitism – in which, for a researcher, the probability to publish 
an article increases with the number of papers she/he has already published (a sort of learning by doing or 
Matthew’s effect).  
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Thus, the idea pushed forward by Ernst et al. (2000) that the distribution of patenting output 
should be even more concentrated than that of scientific publications is hardly acceptable. 
Narin and Breitzman (ibid.) examined how the patents held by four large companies active in 
semiconductor technology (namely, AT&T, Matsushita, Fuji and Xerox) were distributed 
among the inventors occupied by them. Looking at the inventors’ productivity, they found that, 
in each company, the top 1% of them was from 5 to10 times more productive than the average. 
Moreover, they estimated the logarithmic transformation of the following exponential 
equation:  
 
 Y=C/Xα  (1) 
 
where X is the number of patents, Y denotes the number of inventors with X patents, C is a 
constant and α is the coefficient that, according to Lotka’s law, should be equal to 2. For each 
company, Narin and Breitzman’s findings were consistent with the above prediction, 
suggesting that the overall patenting performances of large firms are strongly dependent on the 
ingenuity and creativity of a few key inventors. Accordingly, companies should make every 
effort to retain and nurture them as a sort of golden eggs’ gooses.    
The crucial role played by a narrow set of very productive inventors has been re-stated by 
Ernst at al. (2000) who, by estimating the Lotka’s equation for the patents of 43 German 
companies, find that the α coefficient is very close to 2. However, they also find that patenting 
activity (measured by the raw number of patent applications) is more highly concentrated than 
patenting performance (measured by adjusting the number of applications for their quality). 
Accordingly, these authors contend that “patenting quality tends to increase when the total 
number of patent applications decreases” so that “a higher patent quality can compensate for an 
inventor’s low patenting activity” (ibid., p. 190). Since not all the patented inventions have the 
same value, this casts some doubts on the effectiveness of the Lotka’s law in capturing an 
important dimension of the inventive process.   
Apart from the above two, a few studies (often based on single companies) have examined the 
distribution of patents among individual inventors. Moreover, the functioning of the Lotka’s 
distribution has been almost exclusively tested at company level. However, because such a 
distribution should capture a natural law, it should work also in other contexts. For instance, 
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some authors have considered the scientists of different countries and found that Lotka’s law is 
suitable for representing the distribution of their per-capita publications.  
In the remaining of this section we perform the same test on the inventors residing in Marche, 
an administrative region whose extension has not been established according to economic or 
social criteria. For other types of analysis the above feature could be a shortcoming while, for 
studying how the inventors’ productivity is distributed, it represents an advantage because this 
region can be viewed as a randomly chosen geographical area.  
To test whether the Lotka’s law applies to the patent applications attributed to Marche we 
considered, along with the 570 inventors residing in the region, also 97 extra-regional inventors 
mentioned in the same applications. Indeed, ignoring them would have artificially increased 
the productivity of regional inventors measured in terms of ‘fractional patent counts’ (see 
below). 
 
Table 2 – Number of inventors contributing to patent applications of Marche applicants   
Whole patent counts Fractional patent counts (rounded) 
 Patent applications Inventors Patent applications Inventors 
 1 480 1 271 
2 95 2 72 
3 40 3 18 
4 20 4 12 
5 8 5 3 
6 5 6 4 
7 3 7 3 
8 10 8 8 
9 2 9 1 
10 3 10 4 
11 2 11 1 
12 1 12 1 
13 1 13 1 
14 2 14 2 
15 2 15 1 
16 1 24 1 
20 1   
34 1   
  
 
We then carried out two separate analyses for ‘whole patent counts’ and ‘fractional patent 
counts’ (cf. Table 2). In the first case, the whole invention is attributed to each inventor whose 
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name appears on a patent application. In the second, instead, we work with fractional data by 
giving to each co-inventor an equal portion of the patent. It should be stressed that, in order for 
Lotka’s inverse square law to make sense, fractional count have been rounded.  
By using the data reported in Table 2, we run two estimations of the log-linear version of 
equation 1 (lnY = c – α lnX) with 18 and 16 punctual observations for, respectively, whole and 
fractional patent counts. Table 3 shows that, in both cases, the estimated α is very close to that 
predicted by Lotka and the Wald test does not refuse the hypothesis that such a coefficient is 
equal to -2.  It should be added that α turned out to be different from this value when, rather 
than among inventors, we run the regression across applicants. This confirms that the Lotka’s 
law applies to the inventive performance of individuals and not to that of the organizations 
where they are employed.   
 
Table 3 - Estimates of Lotka exponent 
 α Wald test (α = -2) 
                                        Estimate Prob>| t | F Prob>F 
Whole patent counts −1.945 0.000 0.12  0.736 
Fractional patent counts −1.899 0.000 0.27 0.613 
 
 
The above findings provide additional support to the scale invariance of the Lotka’s 
distribution which appears to fit quite well into different contexts. Here, we have shown that 
this law can work also for the inventors contributing to the patent applications attributed to a 
given geographical area.   
As already said, the above framework depicts the inventive activity as a sort of natural 
phenomenon. Although fascinating, it cannot be denied that such an explanation is not fully 
satisfactory for, at least, three reasons. First, contrary to that of academics, the ability of 
inventors can be partly captured by some individual features (such as the level of education and 
the recourse to more of less sophisticated sources of knowledge). Second, compared to 
academic publishing, patenting is a very expensive activity so that the characteristics of the 
organisations in which the inventors are occupied may exert a significant impact on their 
productivity. Third, as already mentioned, the Lotka’s law performs well for patent counts 
while it may be less effective when patent quality is taken account (Ernst at al., 2000). 
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Accordingly, in what follows, we also explore the qualitative dimension of the inventive 
process.  
3. Inventors’ features and patent quality indicators 
 
To assess whether some individual and organisational features are effective in 
explaining the different productivity of inventors, as well as the different quality of their 
inventions, we carried a survey by means of telephone interviews (see for details Schettino and 
Sterlacchini, 2007). The sample of Marche inventors who took part to the survey is composed 
of 106 individuals accounting for 19% of the original population of inventors and 42% of the 
patent applications attributed to regional applicant. As it emerges by comparing the two 
percentages, the sample was built with a view to over-represent the more productive inventors 
and, then, obtain an adequate variability of the phenomenon under investigation. This implies 
that, in terms of per-capita patents, the sample distribution is less skewed than that concerned 
with the population and, accordingly, the Lotka’s law does not fit well into the sample.  
For each inventor we obtained information on a number of personal features such as age, 
gender, level of education, professional position. As in the PatVal-EU survey (cf. Giuri et al., 
2007), we also asked the inventors to assess the importance of the different sources of 
knowledge used in the inventive process (such as patent and scientific literature). Moreover, 
we distinguished independent inventors (13% of the sample) from firms’ owners (30%) and 
dependent workers (57%). For the last two groups we got information on the size of the firms 
they were working in.  
From the patent documents we were able to infer whether the inventors were working in teams 
or not. The presence of a team of inventors was identified when there were, at least, two or 
three individuals who jointly contributed to, respectively, three or two patent applications. By 
applying this criterion, we found that 24% of the Marche inventors worked in teams. It must be 
stressed that, in our sample, we did not find networks of inventors employed in different 
organisations, so that all the identified teams belong to specific firms.   
Aside from inventive teams, the patent documents were mainly used to extract some 
information on patent quality (or value). In this connection, we collected data on family size, 
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claims and forward and backward citations5, whose descriptive statistics - referring to the 314 
patent applications contained in our sample - are reported in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 – Descriptive statistics of patent quality indicators: EPO applications of  
Marche inventors 
 Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Family size 7.46 5.39 1 34 
Claims 12.93 9.79 1 58 
Forward citations (adjusted) 0.97 1.77 0 8 
Backward citations 3.27 2.70 0 15 
Neutral backward citations 1.89 2.01 0 12 




The extent of family size is given by the number of patents or applications – descending from 
the original one - obtained or filed by the applicant in different countries. As stressed by 
Putnam (1996), one of the first scholars using this indicator of patent quality, family size 
should reflect both the technological and economic importance6 of the invention, simply 
because the overall cost of patenting rises with the number of countries in which a legal 
protection is sought. Lanjouw and Shankerman (2004) observe that more than two-thirds of US 
patentees do not seek protection outside their home markets and find that family size plays a 
relevant role for assessing the quality of computer patents only. The situation is quite different 
for European inventors and the reason is that the centralised procedure managed by the EPO 
becomes convenient when patent protection is sought for, at least, four countries adhering to 
the European Patent Convention. It is then not surprising that, in our sample, the average size 
                                                          
5 Along with those employed in the present study, other indicators of patent quality have extensively been used in 
the empirical literature. Earlier works have employed data on patent renewals (Shankerman and Pakes, 1986) and 
patent scope (Lerner, 1994). The enduring payment of renewal fees signals that the patent has maintained some 
value over time. The patent scope, i.e. the number of technological classes to which it has been ascribed, is a 
proxy for the technological breadth of the invention.  
6 To a different extent, the indicators discussed in this section are good predictors of the economic value of the 
inventions. For a better assessment of the latter, however, direct suvey are needed  (such as the recent PatVal-EU 
survey on European inventors; cf. Giuri et al., 2007). Harhoff et al. (2003) find that the economic value of patents 
(attributed by patent holders) is significantly correlated to a large set of quality indexes obtained from patent 
documents. 
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of patent families is greater than 7 (and that the patent applications with a family size lower 
than 4 account for only 12% of the total).  
The claims included in the patent application identify the specific property rights that the 
patent should protect and their number approximates the ‘scope’ or ‘width’ of the invention 
(Hall et al., 2001). However, although the claims may refer to the both essential and secondary 
novelties embodied in the invention, such a distinction is not provided in the patent documents. 
Also for this reason, the number of claims per patent can be very high and, as Archontopoulus 
et al. (2007) have documented by observing EPO applications over 1980-2004, it has increased 
from 10 to 21. In our sample of patent applications the average number of claims is close to 13. 
On the one hand, it cannot be denied that applicants (often following the advice of patent 
attorneys) are prone to claim as much as possible in their applications. This casts some doubts 
on the effectiveness of claims to capture the inventions’ quality. On the other hand, however, it 
must be taken into account that an excessive amount of claims may compromise the positive 
outcome of the examination process and, in any case, makes it more costly and time 
consuming.     
The number of forward citations received by a patent (or patent application) is particularly 
linked to the technological rather than economic importance of the innovation. In fact, the 
more a patent is cited, the wider is the innovation basis it provides to future inventions 
(Harhoff et al., 1999; Hall et al, 2001). At the same time, however, the invention might not 
receive any monetary rewards for it.   
In attributing forward citations to a patent one has to address the problem of “time truncation”, 
i.e. the fact that more recent patents have, by definition, a lower probability to be cited. A 
solution proposed in the literature is that of considering patents with, at least, a window of five 
years from their application date (Lanjouw and Shankerman, 2004; Mariani and Romanelli, 
2007)7. In our case, this would have meant to neglect all the patent applications filed after 
2001. In order to preserve all the available observations, we adopted instead the “fixed-effects” 
approach proposed by Hall et al. (2001). Accordingly, the number of citations received by a 
patent in a given year is divided by the average number of citations received, in the same year, 
by all the patents of Marche inventors. Nonetheless, such a procedure gives rise to a staggering 
                                                          
7 Hall et al. (2001) show that 60% of the citations recorded by the USPTO patents granted in 1990 is received 
after five years.  
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increase of citations for the few very recent applications that have been already cited, 
artificially over-stating the average quality of the corresponding inventors. To avoid it, we 
attributed a maximum of 8 citations to the most recent applications, which corresponds to the 
maximum number of actual (i.e. not adjusted) citations received in our entire sample. On the 
basis of this conservative procedure, in our sample the average number of (adjusted) forward 
citations per patent is slightly below one, with about one fourth of applications without any 
citations. As for the number of patents per inventor (cf. section 2), this finding is not 
exceptional. Schettino and Sterlacchini (2007) show that, in terms of forward citations per 
patent, the population of Marche inventors is not too different from that concerned with the 
whole Europe (0.20 versus 0.28 citations after three years)8.  
Finally, we also considered backward citations. The latter are important to trace the knowledge 
flows between patented inventions (Hall et al, 2001) also with a view to measure technological 
spillovers among industries and geographical areas (Criscuolo and Verspagen, 2006). 
However, the fact that backward citations are usually significantly correlated with forward 
citations does not imply that also the extent of the former can be viewed as a good proxy of 
patent quality. A large number of backward citations, in fact, could be a signal that the patent 
has a derivative nature and, as such, its novelty and inventive step could be questionable. This 
problem is particularly severe for EPO applications in which almost 90% of citations are added 
by the patent examiners rather than the applicants (cf. Criscuolo and Verspagen, 2006)9. For 
the patents issued by the USPTO the same share, though relevant, is significantly lower (63% 
according to Alcacér and Gittelman, 2005). 
 
                                                          
8 This occurs when controlling for the technological distribution of patents which, in the Marche region, is 
strongly concentrated in the field of Mechanical engineering while being, in the EU15, much more homogenous 
among the different technological fields. 
9 “Under USPTO rules the inventor and his/her attorney are obliged to provide a (complete) list of reference 
describing the state of the art which are considered relevant to the patentability of the invention – the so called 
‘duty of candour’; the EPO has no similar requirements […]. As a result, in the EPO system, examiners tend to be 
responsible for the majority of patent citations.” (Criscuolo and Verspagen, 2006, p. 4).  
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Table 5 – Backward citations by type 
 Total EPO applications 
(1985-2000)* 
EPO applications  
from Danish inventors 
(1978-1997)** 
EPO applications  
from Marche inventors
(1991-2005)*** 
Share of type X citations(a) 0.20 0.20 0.25 
Share of type Y citations(b) 0.16 0.13 0.17 
Share of bad backward citations 
(type X + type Y) 
0.36 0.33 0.42 
Share of neutral backward citations(c) 0.64 0.67 0.58 
 (a)= Citations added by EPO examiners concerned with particularly relevant documents if taken alone. The 
citations included into this category may seriously undermine the novelty and inventive step of the citing 
application. 
(b)= Citations added by EPO examiners concerned with particularly relevant documents if combined with others. 
(c)= Citations added by either applicants or EPO examiners which do not undermine the novelty and inventive 
step of the citing application. 
* Source: Criscuolo and Verspagen (2006). **Source: Schneider (2007). ***Source: own computations from 
OECD/EPO patent citations database. 
 
 
The different types of backward citations attached to EPO applications can be obtained from 
the OECD/EPO patent citations database. The most problematic citations added by EPO 
examiners - which can put at risk the granting of the patent10 - are those conventionally  
classified with the X and Y codes (see Table 5) while other types of citations (including those 
originally inserted by the applicants) do not generate similar prejudices. Summing up types X 
and Y one can compute what we have termed ‘bad’ backward citations while all the other types 
can be grouped under the label of ‘neutral’ backward citations. Table 5 shows that, in our 
sample, the former account for 42% of total backward cites. This share is higher than that 
recorded, on average, by all the EPO applications (Criscuolo and Verspagen, 2006) and by 
those coming from Denmark (Schneider, 2007).  
4. A composite index of patent quality  
 
Since any quality indicator is likely to convey different pieces of information on the 
intrinsic value of patented inventions, Lanjouw and Shankerman (2004) have proposed a 
composite index able to maximise the information content embodied into the distinct measures 
                                                          
10 Lazaridis and Van Pottelsbeghe de la Potterie (2007) contend that the interventions of EPO examiners are 
among the most important determinants of patent withdrawals (this occurs to about one third of total applications 
filed at the EPO). Accordingly, the report on prior art predisposed by examiners - from which the type of 
backward citations can be identified - may have the function of discouraging some of the applicants in continuing 
the examination process. 
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of patent quality discussed in the previous section. Accordingly, we estimate the following 
multiple-indicator model with one latent common factor:  
 
 yki=µki+β'Xi+λkqi+eki (2) 
 
yki is the value in logs of the k indicator concerned with the ith patent. As quality measures we 
considered patent families, claims, forward citations and backward citations: the latter, 
however, are broken down into ‘bad’ cites which, according to the previous discussion, should 
signal less valuable inventions and ‘neutral’ cites whose impact on patent quality cannot be 
established a priori. Xi is a set of characteristics observed for each patent. qi is a latent factor, 
assumed to be distributed as a standard normal, representing the unobserved features common 
to all the quality indicators. The loading factor λk identifies the degree of correlation between 
the original indicators and the common factor. Finally, eki denotes an idiosyncratic component. 
The main assumption of the above model is that the variability of each quality measure is 
jointly generated by those of the common factor and the residual disturbances.  
As in Hall et al. (2007), we estimated qi through a two-step procedure. First, we built a system 
where each indicator of patent value was regressed on two observable characteristics, i.e. the 
year of application and the main IPC technology class, using the seemingly unrelated 
regression. In the second step, we extracted the common factor from the residuals of such 
auxiliary regression by means of maximum likelihood. It must be stressed that the latent factor 
model was estimated on the full set of patent applications (314 observations). Subsequently, we 
computed the mean score attributable to each inventor. 
In building the common quality factor, we first examined the correlation existing among the 
separate indicators. The top panel of Table 6 illustrates two clear points. On the one hand, there 
is a weak statistical association among patent families, claims and forward citations. On the 
other, ‘neutral’ and, to a lower extent, ‘bad’ backward citations are positively correlated only 
with forward citations while a negative association arises between the former and the number 
of claims and between the latter and family size. As a consequence, the inclusion of both kinds 




Table 6 - Correlation matrixes between patent quality indicators 












Family size 1.000     
Claims 0.058 1.000    
Forward citations 0.069 -0.026 1.000   
Neutral backward citations -0.048 -0.127** 0.332** 1.000  
Bad backward citations -0.233** -0.017 0.156** 0.101* 1.000 












Family size 1.000     
Claims 0.106* 1.000    
Forward citations 0.038 0.027 1.000   
Neutral backward citations -0.183** -0.074 0.272** 1.000  
Bad backward citations -0.218** -0.018 0.162** 0.120** 1.000 
*= Significant at 0.1 level of confidence. **= Significant at 0.05 level of confidence. 
 
 
Table 7 – Composite value indexes: correlation with the original variables  
 Value index 1 Value index 2 Value index 3 
Family size 0.386 -0.183 -0.218 
Claims 0.275 -0.074 0.162 
Forward citations 0.099 0.272 -0.018 
Neutral backward citations  1.000  
Bad backward citations   1.000 
 
 
To account for such a problem, we decided to estimate three common quality factors. The first, 
as in Lanjouw and Shankerman (2004), employs patent families, claims and forward citations 
only (Value index1). The other two factors also include, along with the previous indicators, 
‘neutral’ backward (Value index2) and ‘bad’ backward citations (Value index3). The bottom 
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panel of Table 6 reports the correlation among the residuals of the first-step regression. It 
describes the statistical relations that remain in the original indicators once the effects exerted 
by the application year and the main technological class are removed. In this case, both kinds 
of backward citations appear to be negatively associated with family size.  
The exact correlation between the composite quality indexes and the first-step residuals is 
provided by the loading factors displayed in Table 7 which clearly shows that, in our sample, 
backward citations are inadequate proxies of the value of patented inventions. In fact, the 
second and third composite indexes are negatively associated with some of the original quality 
measures and, as such, can be hardly interpreted as proxies of patent value. Instead, Value 
index1 is positively correlated with all the original measures, although particularly with family 
size and claims and, to a lesser extent, with forward citations.  
It should be stressed that our first and preferred indicator of patent quality is identical to that 
employed by Lanjouw and Shankerman (2004) in their econometric analysis of research 
productivity and firms’ market value. Originally, in computing a composite index, these 
authors also used backward citations but, subsequently, they considered only forward citations, 
claims and patent families. Mariani and Romanelli (2007) obtain a synthetic index of patent 
quality and, as in our study, attach it to a sample of 793 European inventors. Along with 
claims, they make use of both forward and backward citations but neglect patent families 
which, in the European context, should be quite effective in signalling the value of patented 
inventions (cf. section 3). Moreover, looking at their estimate of the common quality factor it 
emerges that the latter is mainly influenced by forward citations and claims while backward 
citations play a little role. Instead, as we have clearly shown, in our sample backward citations 
are not only weakly correlated with the other quality measures but those classified as ‘bad’ can 
be negatively associated with patent quality.  
5. Exploring the determinants of inventive productivity and quality 
 
This section investigates econometrically the determinants of the inventors’ 
productivity, measured both in quantitative and qualitative terms. We first assess what are the 
main explanatory factors of the two measures of inventive performance taken separately. In a 
second step, we check whether there is a mutual self-enforcing effect between the two 
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productivity indicators, i.e. if the average number of applications affects patent quality (and 
viceversa).  
For the first step, the equations to be estimated are the following:   
 
 iii eNPAT ++= X'0 αα  (3) 
 
 iii uAVQ ++= X'0 ββ  (4) 
 
NPAT is the number of patent applications, in logs, of the ith inventor, taken as a quantitative 
indicator of her/his inventive productivity. AVQ is the average level of patent quality 
attributable to each inventor on the basis of the score obtained by her/his patent applications. 
Such a score is the value of the composite index of patent quality extracted from the number of 
forward citations, claims and patent family (see, in the previous section, Value index 1). The 
vector Xi includes a set of explanatory variables, common to both specifications, representing 
some key characteristics of either the inventor or the firm where she/he is employed.  
With respect to the firms’ features we considered two dummy variables for large and medium-
sized firms (with, respectively, more than 250 and between 50 and 249 employees) and the 
extent of patent portfolios measured by the log of patent applications that the firm (or, in case 
of an independent inventor, the individual) filed at the EPO during the examined period. 
Among the individual features, there are two dummy variables for whether the inventor is a 
male and possesses a tertiary level of education (university degree or PhD). Moreover, as a 
proxy of experience, we included the log of the inventor’s age, both in linear and quadratic 
form. Somewhat in between individual and firm characteristics, we also inserted a dummy 
variable for the inventors who worked in teams. Moreover, we considered whether the inventor 
ascribed a great importance (identified by a score of 5 or 4 in a Likert scale ranging from 1 
“not important” to 5 “very important) to the use of two sources of codified knowledge: patent 
literature (i.e. the search in patent databases) and scientific literature.  Finally, as further 
controls, we included in both equations seven dummy variables for the main IPC technological 
classes in which the patent applications of the inventors are classified11. 
                                                          
11 The technological classes that have been considered are the following: Electrical-electronic technologies; 
Instruments; Chemicals, Drugs & Biotechnology; Material processing; Thermal processes; Other process 
engineering; Consumer goods; Mechanical engineering. The first three labels correspond to the first three of the 5 
macro-technological fields of the IPC classifications. The remaining five labels derive from a re-combination of 
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The equations (3) and (4) have been estimated as a simultaneous system through the Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression (SUR) method by making a small sample adjustment for computing the 
covariance matrix of the residuals. It should be stressed that, in our first estimation, the set of 
explanatory variable is the same for the two equations so that the results are equivalent to those 
provided by OLS. Table 8 reports the regression results apart from those concerned with the 
dummies for technological fields which are omitted for the sake of brevity.  
 
Table 8 - Determinants of inventors’ productivity and patent value: SUR estimates.  
  System (1)-(2) System (1)-(3) 
 (1) (2) (3) 






    
Ln Number of patents    -0.020 
   (0.077) 
Large firm 0.317* -0.127 -0.121 
 (0.191) (0.139) (0.141) 
Medium-sized firm 0.110 0.053 0.055 
 (0.133) (0.096) (0.097) 
Ln Patent portfolio 0.145* 0.000 0.003 
 (0.080) (0.058) (0.059) 
Team 0.432** 0.291** 0.300** 
 (0.162) (0.117) (0.122) 
Ln Age 9.328 11.843** 12.029** 
 (7.019) (5.088) (5.152) 
(Ln Age)2 -1.172 -1.519** -1.542** 
 (0.895) (0.648) (0.656) 
Higher education -0.130 0.174** 0.172** 
 (0.116) (0.084) (0.085) 
Gender (male) 0.014 0.324** 0.324** 
 (0.216) (0.157) (0.157) 
Patent literature 0.192 0.054 0.058 
 (0.131) (0.095) (0.096) 
Scientific literature interact-







Constant -18.077 -23.629** -23.990** 
 (13.751) (9.968) (10.090) 
    
Log-likelihood  -89.59 -89.59 
AIC  251.2 253.2 
Notes: Each specification includes a set of dummies for IPC technological classes. Standard errors 
are in brackets. *= Significant at 0.1 level of confidence. **= Significant at 0.05 level of confidence. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
the 30 technological fields in which the IPC classification is usually broken down. 
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Starting from the inventors’ productivity (column 1), the presence of an inventive team within 
the firms exerts a positive and very significant impact. In addition, the number of patents per 
inventor is higher for larger firms and rises with the size of their patent portfolios. Both 
coefficients, however, are significant only at a 10% level of confidence and this is probably 
due to the fact that the two variables are highly correlated (in fact, the Spearman’s correlation 
coefficient is 0.698). Since none of the individual features considered influences the dependent 
variable in a significant manner12, the inventors’ productivity appears to be explained by 
organizational characteristics only. 
Moving to the quality of the inventors’ patent applications (column 2), the size of the firms and 
that of their patent portfolios are no longer significant. This suggests that the inventors working 
in small entities or independently do not seek international protection for less valuable 
inventions. This is not surprising because, due to the difficulties and costs of European 
patenting, also ‘small applicants’ must be selective in deciding what invention is worth to be 
patented.  
Although they tend to be more present in larger firms with wider patent portfolios, inventive 
teams exert an autonomous, positive and significant impact on patent quality. This suggests 
that it is not the size of the firms or their propensity to patent but the size of their inventive 
activities (proxied by the number of people who are formally recognised as ‘inventors’) which 
allow them to attain more valuable inventions. Thus, the presence of an inventive team is 
effective in rising both the quantity and quality of inventions. The latter, however, is also 
enhanced by individual features. Male inventors and those with higher education contribute to 
more valuable patent applications. Also experience matters, as witnessed by the fact that the 
patent quality rises with the age of inventors. However, the relationship is inverted U-shaped 
so that the oldest inventors have no advantages over the younger ones. Finally, while the 
importance attributed to patent literature is not significant, a negative impact on patent quality 
is found when the inventors working in medium-sized firms ascribe a great importance to 
scientific literature. This finding is probably due the peculiar occupational position of the few 
inventors who have attained a PhD.   
                                                          
12 Almost identical results arise when equation (3) is estimated by means of a negative binomial regression (which 
is particularly adequate for analysing count data like patents).  
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In a second step we also checked whether there is cross-fertilization between the quantitative 
and qualitative performance of each inventor. For this purpose, we first inserted NPAT among 
the explanatory variables of AVQ (cf. equations 3 and 4) and, then, estimated the system by 
means of the SUR method. The third column of Table 8 shows that the patent quality attributed 
to each inventor is not significantly associated with the number of patents per inventor13, while 
all the effects already stressed in commenting the previous estimation are confirmed. We have 
also tested the opposite relation, i.e. whether the patent quality may spur the amount of patent 
applications per inventor. However, when inserted into the NPAT equation the composite index 
of patent quality turns out to be not significant and the results reported in column 1 of Table 8 
are confirmed14. 
Our results are not consistent with those provided by Mariani and Romanelli (2007) for a 
sample of European inventors. These authors show that patent quality is a sort of purely 
random phenomenon being not significantly influenced by a set of explanatory factors similar 
to those employed in the present study. Moreover, in contrast to the same study, we do not find 
that a larger number of patents increases the probability of developing more valuable 
inventions. The above discrepancies, however, are not surprising. Our sample, although 
slightly biased towards more productive inventors, is dominated by ‘small applicants’: only 
36% of the inventors took part to more than two patent applications over a period of 15 years 
(1991-2005). The sample used by Mariani and Romanelli (2007), instead, over-represents the 
European inventors working in large firms as witnessed by the fact that 56% of them 
contributed to more than two patents in a time span of 11 years (1988-1998). Accordingly, by 
considering a larger share of inventors working in small firms or independently, our study 
shows that their patent quality is significantly affected by some individual features.  
                                                          
13This precludes the utilization of three-stage least squares in order to assess the consistency of the NPAT 
coefficient in the second equation. 
14 These results are not reported for the sake of synthesis but are available from the authors upon request.  
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6. Summary and concluding remarks 
  
As we have documented in section 2, over a period of 15 years, the large majority of 
European inventors contributed to only one patent application at the EPO. On the other hand, 
80% of patent applications at the EPO are coming from 20% of applicants and the ten most 
active companies account for 12% of total applications. Moreover, from the studies reviewed 
in the same section, we know that a disproportionate share of the numerous patents held by 
large companies is coming from a few key inventors. Combining these pieces of evidence, it is 
not surprising that the distribution of patents among inventors is extremely skewed and 
consistent with that identified by Lotka in 1926 for scientific publications. 
In this paper we have considered the population of inventors residing in an Italian region (the 
Marche). Its borders were established long time ago according to historical, cultural and, above 
all, administrative criteria so that, for the purpose of our study, the Marche can be viewed as a 
randomly chosen geographical area. We found that also in this area the distribution of patent 
applications among inventors is consistent with the ‘inverse square law’ introduced by Lotka.  
Having established that, the next step has been that of looking for some explanations of the 
above phenomenon. In effect, the extent of patenting activities among inventors is likely to be 
significantly influenced by some measurable characteristics which may refer either to the same 
inventors or the organizations they are working for. Moreover, an extremely skewed 
distribution emerges by looking at patent counts while the results could be different when 
patents are weighted according to their technological and economic value. As a consequence, 
the search for some possible determinants of the inventors’ productivity and patent quality is 
worth to be pursued.  
By using the findings of a survey concerned with a sample of Marche inventors, this paper has 
provided an attempt in this direction. Starting from the quantitative dimension, we found that 
the number of patent applications per inventor does not depend upon any individual 
characteristics but it is positively influenced by organizational variables such as the presence of 
an inventive team, the firms’ size and the extent of their patent portfolios. The average quality 
of the patent applications of each inventor has been approximated by a composite index 
extracted from the numbers of forward citations, claims and patent families. Backward 
citations are not included in the above index because, in our sample, they are negatively 
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correlated with the other quality measures and, accordingly, are likely to be imperfect proxies 
of patent value. The regression analysis across inventors show that patent quality is positively 
affected by different individual features such as age, level of education and gender while, 
among the organizational characteristics, only the presence of an inventive team exerts a 
significant positive impact. The fact that patent quantity and quality are rather independent 
phenomena is confirmed by a further estimate showing that the inventors’ productivity does 
not significantly influence the average quality of their inventions.  
In conclusion, the skewed distribution of inventive productivity is not only a product of a 
natural law but also depends upon the size of the firms the inventors are working in, as well as 
the extent of collective work undertaken to attain an invention. Along with quantity, the 
working within an inventive team also increases the quality of patent applications. The latter, 
however, is also enhanced by the inventors’ experience and level of education. This helps 
explain why occasional inventors generate inventions that are as valuable as those coming from 
the most prolific ones.   
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